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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DRAPER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, J 
v. '! 
CLAUDIA R. BROWN, BUG PARTS 
UNLIMITED, INC., dba MOTIVATION ) 
ENTERPRISES, and WESTERN ] 
SURETY COMPANY, ] 
Defendants. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Appellant. ] 
1 CASE NO. 20591 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Whether the actions of defendant Claudia Brov/n as-
set fcrth in the undisputed facts constituted fraud upon the 
plaintiff. 
2. Whether defendant Claudia Brown was acting on 
behalf of Motivation Enterprises or on her personal behalf 
when she applied for and obtained the loan from the plaintiff. 
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3. Whether the motor vehicle dealers bond in question 
would cover the loss suffered by the plaintiff if such loss was 
caused by the actions of defendant Claudia Brown. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Plaintiff Draper Bank & Trust Company (hereinafter 
"Draper Bank") brought suit against Claudia P.. Brown (hereinafter 
"Ms. Brown"), Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba Motivation 
Enterprises (hereinafter "Motivation Enterprises"), and Western 
Surety Company (hereinafter "Western Surety"), to recover the 
proceeds of a loan made to Ms. Brown. Plaintiff's claim against 
this defendant, Western Surety, is based on a motor vehicle 
dealer's bond issued by Western Surety to Motivation Enterprises. 
Draper Bank alleged that the actions of Ms. Brown in obtaining a 
loan to purchase a personal automobile were frcuc'ulent, and 
Western Surety was, therefore, obligated under its bond. 
Upon cross-motions for summary ji c^ irert filer1 by Traper 
Bank and Western Surety, hearing was held before Third District 
Court, Judge Scctt Daniels on February 8, 1985, and judgment was 
entered in favor of Draper Bank and against Western Surety. Such 
judgment was based solely upon a finding that Ms. Brown committed 
fraud upon Draper Bank and that such fraud was covered by the bond 
issued to Motivation Enterprises. (See Transcript of Hearing, 
pp. 20, 21.) 
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This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the 
judgment entered. Specifically, Western Surety seeks reversal of 
the finding that Ms. Brown committed fraud upon Draper Bank in 
obtaining the loan in question, and that such fraud was covered 
by the motor vehicle dealerfs bond issued to Motivation 
Enterprises. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 9, 1979, Draper Bank loaned 
Ms. Brown $11,500.00 for the purchase of a 1978 Porche 924 
automobile, serial number 1248207920, for her personal use. 
Accordingly, the loan was in Ms. Brown's name and she signed as 
the only responsible party. (See Deposition of Claudia R. Brown 
Conger, p. 21 lines 3-5, p. 33 line 15; attached Promissory Note; 
and plaintiff's Amended Complaint, paragraph 2.) Ms. Brown paid 
approximately $600.00 down for the purchase of the car and the 
proceeds of the loan were made payable to Ms. Brown and 
Motivation Enterprises. (See Deposition of Claudia R. Brown 
Conger, p. 20 line 14; and attached Cashiers Check.) 
The car was selected from the Salt Lake Auto Auction and 
Motivation Enterprises became involved in the transaction due to 
auction rules that only dealers could purchase at the auction. 
(See Deposition of Claudia R. Brown Conger, pp. 16, 17•) 
Motivation Enterprises was owned and operated at the time of the 
loan by Ms. Brown's husband, Harold Michael Brown (hereinafter 
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"Mr. Brown"), from whom she was then separated and has since 
divorced. (See Deposition of Claudia R. Brown Conger, pp. 8, 9, 
17.) 
Ms. Brown's involvement with Motivation Enterprises was 
as either the secretary or the vice-president of the company, but 
her actual responsibilities with the company were limited, as she 
had nothing to do with the day-to-day operation of the business. 
(See Deposition of Claudia R. Brown Conger, pp. 8, 11, 12.) 
Upon purchasing the car through Motivation Enterprises, 
a disagreement as to the price of the car arose. Thereafter, 
rather than presenting the cashier's check to Mr. Brown, 
Ms. Brown endorsed the check in her own name, signing as 
vice-president of Motivation Auto, and deposited the check in her 
own account at "Tack & Togs", a western tack store owned 
personally by her. The next day, Ms. Brown wrote a personal 
check, reflecting the lower price, payable to Mr. Brown for the 
purchase of the car. (See Deposition of Claudia R. Brown Conger, 
pp. 21, 22, 23.) 
After purchasing the car, Ms. Brown paid three monthly 
installments to Draper Bank and attempted to obtain title to the 
vehicle to give to the bank. (See Deposition of Claudia R. Brown 
Conger, pp. 25, 26, 28.) Due to her inability to secure the 
title to the car, Ms. Brown had the car resold through the Salt 
Lake Auto Auction sometime in April of 1979 in an attempt to 
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obtain funds to pay off the loan. (See Deposition of Claudia R. 
Brown Conger, pp. 25, 26.) Ms. Brown was unable to get the 
proceeds from the second sale and she urged Mr. Brown to continue 
the payments, which he did reducing the loan balance to 
$8,549.15. (See Deposition of Claudia R. Brown Conger, pp. 25, 
26.) As of March 7, 1983, this balance remained due, Ms. Brown 
was in default on the loan and Draper Bank brought suit to 
recover the balance. Said suit was based upon Ms. Brown's 
execution of a promissory note and her subsequent default. (See 
Plaintiff's original Complaint, paragraphs 2, 7.) 
On or about January 13, 1984, Draper Bank amended its 
complaint to include as defendants, Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., 
dba Motivation Enterprises, and Western Surety. (See Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint.) Draper Bank's claim against Western Surety 
was based upon a motor vehicle dealer's bond issued to Motivation 
Enterprises. (See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.) It was 
alleged that Ms. Brown had committed fraud upon Draper Bank and 
that Western Surety, by reason of its bond, became liable to 
Draper Bank for any loss suffered by way of Ms. Brown's fraud. 
On February 8, 1985, cross-motions for summary judgment 
were heard before the Honorable Scott Daniels, whereupon summary 
judgment was granted in favor of Draper Bank and against Western 
Surety. The judgment, against Western Surety, was based solely 
on the court's finding that Ms. Brown had committed fraud upon 
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the plaintiff. (See Transcript of Hearing, pp. 21, 21.) A 
written order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
was entered by the court on March 19, 1985. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The judgment entered by the trial court which was based 
totally on fraud by Ms. Brown should be reversed because 
Ms. Brown's actions did not amount to fraud as defined by Utah 
law. There is no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Brown 
misrepresented a presently existing material fact or that she did 
not intend to carry out her promise to repay her loan when she 
applied for and obtained the loan from Draper Bank. To the 
contrary, the undisputed facts show that Ms. Brown never intended 
to defraud Draper Bank and that she endeavored to carry out her 
obligations on the loan agreement. Ms. Brown may have breached 
her contract to repay her loan, but such breach does not rise to 
the level of fraud. 
If this court finds Ms. Brown committed fraud upon 
Draper Bank, such fraud would have been committed in her 
individual capacity, and not as a representative of Motivation 
Enterprises. The loan documents and the testimony of Ms. Brown 
show that the loan transaction was a personal loan to Ms. Brown. 
She was not acting as a dealer or in behalf of a motor vehicle 
dealer when she obtained the loan or at any time thereafter. The 
bond in question, a copy of which is attached, applies to actions 
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committed "as a dealer". The applicable Utah statute and case 
law make it clear that Western Surety would only be liable on its 
bond in this case if Ms. Brown had been acting for Motivation 
Enterprises as a dealer, which she was not. The judgment below 
must, therefore, be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CLAUDIA BROWN'S ACTIONS DID NOT 
AMOUNT TO FRAUD UPON DRAPER BANK, AND 
WESTERN SURETY IS THEREFORE NOT LIABLE TO 
DRAPER BANK FOR ANY LOSS IT MAY HAVE 
SUFFERED. 
Draper Bank, in its amended complaint, alleged that 
Ms. Brown committed fraud upon Draper Bank by failing to obtain 
title to the vehicle and failing to note its lien thereon. (See 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.) It was further alleged that 
Western Surety became liable, as surety for Motivation 
Enterprises, for the loss suffered by Draper Bank from the fraud 
of Ms. Brown. (See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.) The 
undisputed facts, however, as they were presented on the 
cross-motions for summary judgment below, are totally devoid of 
evidence that Ms. Brown commited fraud, and the summary judgment 
entered must, therefore, be reversed. 
It should be noted that in review of a judgment entered 
on cross-motions for summary judgment, the "clearly erroneous" 
standard applicable to factual findings of a trial court is 
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inapplicable, Wessells v. State Department of Highways, Alaska, 
562 P.2d 1042, 1046 (1977)• Rather, in such a casef where the 
facts were undisputed and the issue is one of law, the Supreme 
Court is not bound by the conclusions of the trial court and may 
determine the question for itself. Pacific Development Co. v. 
Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748, 751 (1948); and Betenson v. 
Call Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., Utah, 645 P.2d 684, 687 (1982). 
Thus, in reviewing the judgment below, this court is free to 
determine whether the undisputed facts "clearly and convincingly" 
establish the essential elements of fraud. Taylor v. Gasor, 
Inc., Utah, 607 P.2d 293, 295 (1980). 
In Taylor, the court set forth the essential elements of 
fraud and recognized the appropriate burden of proving fraud as 
follows: 
A finding of fraud must be based on the 
existence of all its essential elements, 
i.e., the making of a false 
representation concerning a presently 
existing material fact which the 
representor either knew to be false or 
made recklessly without sufficient 
knowledge, or the omission of a material 
fact when there is a duty to disclose, 
for the purpose of inducing action on the 
part of the other party, with actual, 
justifiable reliance resulting in damage ^ 
to that party. [citations omitted] 
As stated in Lundstrom v. Radio 
Corporation of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 
117-18, 405 P.2d 339, 341 (1965), "fraud 
is a wrong of such nature that it must be 
shown by clear and convincing proof and 
will not lie in mere suspicion or 
inuendo." Id. at 294. 
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of Claudia R. Brown Conger, pp. 26, 28; and Plaintifffs Amended 
Complaint, paragraph 6.) Further evidence of Ms. Brown's intent 
to carry out her obligation on the loan is found from her attempt 
to obtain title to give to Draper Bank, and her subsequent sale 
of the car in an attempt to get funds to pay off the loan. (See 
Deposition of Claudia R. Brown Conger, pp. 28, 33.) Thus, rather 
than scienter to commit fraud, the facts clearly show an intent 
on the part of Ms. Brown to carry out her obligations on the 
promissory note, which intent remained while she possessed the 
car and after she sold the car. In short, Ms. Brown "never tried 
to defraud [Draper Bank] out of anything." (See Deposition of 
Claudia R. Brown Conger, pp. 19, 35.) 
The fact that Ms. Brown failed to obtain title as agreed 
and defaulted on the note, subsequent to obtaining the loan, does 
not indicate or establish fraud, but rather a breach of contract. 
A promise to perform certain acts in the future is not fraudulent 
unless accompanied by a present intention not to perform it. 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, Utah, 645 P.2d 608, 
611 (1982). 
The gist of the fraud, in such cases, is 
not the breach of a promise, but the 
fraudulent intent of the promisor or 
obligor at the time he makes the promise 
or executed the contract, net to perform 
the same, and to deceive the obligee by 
his false promise. Hence to render 
nonperformance fraudulent, the intention 
not to perform must exist when the 
promise is made, and if the promise is 
-10-
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The general rulef ... is that "fraud 
cannot be predicated on a promise not 
performed; that, to constitute actionable 
fraud there must be a false assertion in 
regard to some existing matter by which a 
party is induced to part with his money 
or property." The mere nonperformance of 
a promise made in the course of 
negotiations or the failure to carry out 
an intention expressed in the course of 
such negotiations is not of itself either 
a fraud or evidence of a fraud, in the 
absence of allegations and proof that the 
representations were falsely and 
fraudulently made with intent to deceive; 
that is, that the statement of intent as 
to the future was made in bad faith: 
[citations omitted]. A representation to 
be fraudulent in the legal sense, must 
relate to a past fact or present 
condition, and must not be a mere 
promise: [citations omitted]. Ld. at 
281. 
The Butte Motor court then found that there was no evidence that 
the dealer's promise to pay was not made in good faith. 
Consequently, there was no fraud but merely a breach of a promise 
to perform and the surety was not liable on the bond. 
The scope of liability imposed by a motor vehicle 
dealer's bond is further illustrated by Kerr v. Schwartz, New 
Mexico, 475 P.2d 457 (1970). In that case, the plaintiff traded 
in his car for the purchase of a new car. The trade-in value was 
$1,900.00 and it was agreed that this would be applied towards 
the purchase price of the new car. The new car was never 
delivered and the plaintiff brought suit against the surety and 
another. The court found that there was no evidence that the 
-12-
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upon that finding the judgment of the lower court must: be 
reversed. 
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POINT II 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT DEPENDANT 
CLAUDIA BROWN COMMITTED FRAUD UPON DRAPER 
BANK, SUCH FRAUD WOULD NOT BE COVERED BY 
WESTERN SURETY'S BOND BECAUSE MS. BROWN 
WAS NOT ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE BONDED 
DEALER. 
Even if Ms. Brown was guilty of fraud as against Draper 
Bank, which she was not, such fraud would not be covered by the 
motor vehicle dealer's bond issued to Motivation Enterprises, 
That such bonds do not cover every fraudulent act that a dealer 
or a dealer's salesman may make, is clear from the statute 
requiring the bond and the case law analyzing the scope of such 
bonds. The statute requiring motor vehicle dealers to be bonded, 
Utah Code Ann., §41-3-16(1), provides in pertinent part: 
The bond shall be approved as to form by 
the attorney general, and conditioned 
that the applicant will conduct business 
as a dealer without fraud or fraudulent 
representation,.... [emphasis added]. 
Further, Utah Code Ann., §41-3-18, which allows a right of action 
against the dealer and the surety when the dealer commits fraud, 
states in pertinent part: 
A person who suffers a loss or damage by 
reason of fraud,... by a licensed dealer, 
[or] one of his salesmen acting for the 
dealer on his behalf,... shall have the 
right to maintain an action for recovery 
against a dealer,... and the [surety].... 
-14-
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I'liiiii ill p. i lleai I lull I he ImimJ cove r s f raud committed 
by the d e a l e r ui h i s salesmen only when such -. *.. . imir.*-n 
by (he dea le r wihiTi innrliirtinM b u s i n e s s as i r wueu bucu 
I m i n i W.JI1 iiiiiiii I I I enl h y ,JII ' J . I [ e i j i ik i i i .tell \\w\ 1 i ^ r o n h i s 
behalf 
T h e c a s e I a w a 1:1 a 1 y z i n g t h e scope o f s 1 1 c h a b o n d 
Sales, Utah, 645 P, 2d 684 (3 982) addressed thIs thresho] d Issue 
regarding the scope of a dealer's bond,, as follows: • _ _. 
It Is clear that coverage under the bond 
exists only for activities constituting 
the conduct of a dealer's business "as a 
dealerrn or for activities which the 
dealer has represented as part of his 
business "as a dea ler." 
• " ' • 
In a more recent case, "Western surety Co, 
v. Redding, Utah, 626 P.2d 437, 439 
(1981), this court emphasized that the 
bond "was intended to protect all pers^ 
doing business with a motor vehicle 
dealer." We note that the foregoing 
statement is accurate so long as the 
motor vehicle dealer is himself doing 
business as a dealer; the bond was never 
intended to indemnify all persons who 
contract with a dealer In a capacity 
unrelated to his motor vehicle 
dealership. Betenson at 687. 
Ii : • "I -he i nisi ,ai: /ill mat .t ei: H 5 B: : :: 1: 1 a|: »j: > 1 i e d f- :: r 1 .I:: .• = • ] : a r 
from, D r ap e 1: B a 1 lk i 1 1 h e r :i nd I v I d u a 1 c a pa c 11 y, 11 o t a s a de a 1 e r o r 
on beha.1 f <:: f a motor vehicle dealer. 1 Is. Brown was the sole 
- 1 5 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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applicant for the loan and her signature is the sole signature on 
the loan application form. She also signed as the only 
responsible party on the promissory note. (See attached 
Promissory Note; and Loan Approval Form.) As the loan was 
clearly a personal loanf applied for and received by Ms. Brown in 
her individual capacity, the bond issued by Western Surety to 
Motivation Enterprises would not cover all actions that Ms. Brown 
may have committed, only those committed "as a dealer". The 
applicable statutes and controlling case law make this clear. 
Furthermore, besides being a personal loan taken out in 
her individual capacity, it is clear that when Ms. Brown endorsed 
the loan check, she did so because she was at odds with 
Motivation Enterprises in that she could not agree on a price for 
the car with them. (See Deposition of Claudia R. Brown Conger, 
p. 22.) She then endorsed the check, deposited it in her 
checking account and wrote a personal check to Motivation 
Enterprises reflecting a lower price. (See Deposition of Claudia 
P.. Frown Conger, pp. 22, 23.) These facts clearly indicate that 
Ms. Brown was not acting as a dealer or for and in behalf of 
Motivation Enterprises but on her own behalf. Therefore, Western 
Surety is not liable to Draper Bank for the loss suffered by 
reason of any fraud committed by Ms. Brown. If any such fraud 
occurred, she was acting in her personal capacity and Western 
Surety cannot be held responsible for it. The judgment of the 
lower court must, therefore, be reversed. 
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CONCLDSION 
W e s t e r n S u r e t y r e q u e s t s t h i s c o u r t t o r e v e r s e t h e 
ludqment rendered be J ow Si ich ji idgment w as based i ipe -i 1 a 
I, !"i al. Flu , Hi owl 1 had def rauded Drapei: Bai ik a nd t h a t such fraud was 
covered by Western S u r e t y ' s bond Both of t h e s e bases a r e 
d e a r l y iinfiuppoi ted by t h e ev idence and the judgment must be 
in "i M in s e i II 
DATED this day of July, 1985. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
TERRY/M. PLANT 
Atttipney for Appei Lant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ^TT^L day of July, 1985, four (4) true and correct 
copies each of the foregoing to the following: 
Dwight L. King, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2121 South State, #205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
David E. Yocom, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Claudia Brown 
255 East 400 South, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
-18-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 
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I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 | 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 
22 
23 
c 
C f l t k o IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
V Salt Lake County Utah 
MAR 1 r 4,Q 60 
H/bixc^indley. C : ^ C i ^ . Court 
By - N . ' ' r ' iJejwty Clerk 
DWIGHT L. KING #591 
DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 205 Sentinel Building 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 486-8701 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DRAPER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAUDIA R. BROWN, BUG PARTS 
UNLIMITED, INC., dba MOTIVATION 
ENTERPRISES, and WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-2938 
Judge Scott Daniels 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly to be heard 
before the Honorable Scott Daniels, one of the Judges of the above-
entitled Court, on the 8th day of February, 1985 at the hour of 
2:00 o'clock P.M. Plaintiff appeared by its attorney, Dwight L. 
King. Defendant Claudia R. Brown appeared by her attorney, David E 
Yocom. Western Surety Company appeared by its attorney, Terry M. 
Plant. The matter came on for hearing before the Court on motions 
for summary judgment filed by plaintiff and by Western Surety 
Company. Both plaintiff and Western Surety Company stipulated in 
open court that the deposition of defendant Claudia R. Brown could 
be received by the Court, that the deposition described the 
transaction between Claudia R. Brown, Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., 
-<! >"*» 
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dba Motivation Enterprises, and Draper Bank & Trust Company. 
Defendant Western Surety Company's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
2 I submitted based on the deposition and argued that no fraud is 
2 shown as that is defined by the sections of Utah Code Annotated 
relating to bonding of automobile dealers. Draper Bank & Trust's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was based on the Claudia R. Brown 
deposition and exhibits submitted. Its claim was that the 
^ exhibits and the Claudia R. Brown deposition show that there was 
7 J fraud committed upon the plaintiff as defined by Utah Code 
Annotated relating to bonding of-automobile dealers. There was 
no dispute concerning the balance owing on the Draper Bank & Trust 
Company promissory note. 
The matter was argued and submitted and the Court, being 
8 
9 
10 
II fully informed in the premises, does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND 
12 
13 
14 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
23 
DECREE as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is granted judgment against the defendant 
Western Surety Company for the sum of $12,976.20, the principal 
balance owing together with interest to the 8th day of February, 
1985. 
16 I 2. Judgment is based upon the finding by the Court that the 
conduct of Claudia R. Brown was in fraud of the rights of the 
plaintiff as defined by Utah Code Annotated relating to bonding of 
automobile dealers and the Bond of Motor Vehicle Dealers, Exhibit 4> 
requires defendant Western Surety Company to pay the damage caused 
, \ • } / 
t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . 
2 ! I DONE IN OPEN COURT t h i s 1^] day o f EeferOT^y, 198£ 
22 .^» BY THE COURT 
ATTEST ,r*? 
. DIXON h;?<CLSY ' 
Cmk/1 JUDGE 
: RT: xv 
-^Lo^kiju.fo 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing Summary 
Judgment was mailed this day of February, 1985, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
David E. Yocom 
Attorney for Defendant Claudia R. Brown 
255 East 400 South, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Terry M. Plant 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith 
Attorneys for Defendant Western Surety Co. 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 / 
I /tA-y /,. s i ^ ^ -^A A ^ 
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SUMMARY STATEMENT 
U La*n Proceed* - - - - " $.-ll,iOO-Oa.-
2. Other charges: 
'Fees or taxes: 
$ 
$ — 
Credit Insurance (See 10 below) $ „40 
Other: $ 
$ -... $.. 
3. Amount Financed $--4-l-kS00-«G0 
4. FINANCE CHARGE * 2-»4*4»-K 
5. ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE 1.4.....% 
6. Total of Payments (3 + 4) $ J 4 « l A i e i l ~ 
Payable as checked: 
• Single payment on , 19 
g f ] ...36. successive monthly installments of $ 394.02•• <»cn o n the 4.5Cn. day of 
each month commencing .. February-15., » 19.79..., w i t h find installment in 
amount of $.394«02— due on Tinnsry 15, • 19-82— 
7. • Balloon payment of $ due , 19 may be refinanced as follows: 
8. Prepayment 0/ loan with interest to date of prepayment may be made without penalty except that Lender 
may collect a minimum finance charge of $5 on loans of $75 or less and $7.50 on loans in excess of $75. 
9. Prepaid finance charge $ Required deposit balance $ 
10. Credit insurance is not required by Lender but will be purchased if requested. 
Purchase credit insurance: Q life at cost of $ ; Q life and disability at cost of $ 
Borrower to be insured. 
11. If any default occurs. Lender may offset against this loan any bank account or other amounts owed by 
Lender in any capacity to Borrower. 
Q This loan is otherwise unsecured. 
£ | This loan is secured by £g Security Agreement, Q Trust Deed of even date and reference is made to 
such document(s) and to separate loan disclosure statement for additional information. 
12. Reasonable attorney's fees, legal expenses and lawful collection costs incurred after default may be imposed. 
Received this statement and note, with all blanks completed, before signing any document evidencing this 
loan. 
Date:. «.JJUJLJ£11 
PROMISSORY NOTE (Interest) 
....J.ajmaryJLt~~ . »~Z9— 
Tha undersigned, jointly and severalty, promise to pay to the order of Drapax Rank. k. XZUBZ... 
at 9.Q.3. E». IZ3QQ. SCU in Draper , Utah, or at Mich other place aa tha holder hereof may 
& 7 2 / 1 0 0 
designate in writing, tha sum oTOUTEEHTHQUSAIlDQHEUlINiMLEDEIGaTYFOUH-r. (Sl4*l£4*.22 ). payabla aa follow.: 
36 Succaaalva Hoothly Inata l laents of $394*02 amen due) tha 15th day of etch sooth 
en—ncing February 15, 1979* 
together with intareat on tha unpaid balance thereof from data until \mid at the rate of EQUiXEEM per cent (..14 %) per 
annum, intareat payable aa follow*: 
MONTHLY 
Prepayment of thia note with interest to date of payment may be made at any time without penalty. 
If the holder deema itaeif inaecure or if default be made in payment of the whole or any part of any installment at the 
time when or the pluce where the sume becomes due and payable as aforenuid, then the entire unpaid balance, with interest as 
aforesaid, shall, at the election of the holder hermit and without notice of <*aid election at once become due and payable. In 
event of any such defuult or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay to the holder hereof reaaonabie 
attorney's feea, legal expenses and lawful collection costs in addition to ull other »um* due hereunder. 
Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of time without notice are hereby waived and the) under-
signed consent to glavJBf^ ease ojfjsny security>ae*sjpy part thereof, with oc^wljhout substitution. 
* $ /AS?
 v 
L f 0£C101980 ) c \^ljCj*^6*s&^ 
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YEAR 
TEA 
NEW 
USED 
N/U 
tf/ 
MAKE-TRAOS-NAME 
^ • ^ 
NO. 
CYL. 
1Z1 
WORK SHEET 
o ^ c ^ n * . S ^ ^ - o ^ -
,&/< <?.*J 
MANUFACTURER SERIAL NO. ' 
OR MOTOR NUMBER 
/-dv.3f\y<;.m 
-
LICENSE ' 
NUMBER 
urfA'tifrtf* 
JPOWER STEERING n f i POWER ^ BRAKES r - n A U T O r n ^ S P E E O ran, *—* TRANS. H P TRAMS. (A^ 
1. CASH IJLLIMQ »«IC« a * / ^ 5 ^ 0 * *
 T A X $ . 
•
POWER r -J POWER 
WINOOWS L - J 
STEREO 
V I N Y L T O * 
j £ 2 £ tfO 
SEATS 
TOTAL 
1 SUN ROOF 
J*AIR CONO. 
A M / P M 8 T E R I 
TAPS OSCK 
TRAOS-4N A M O U N T . 
DESCRIPTION _ _ « 
LESS OWING 8 - ^ 3 = 
rt^ 
NET 8 -
CASH DOWN PAYMENT 8 - ., J*?*'" 
3. 
4. 
UNPAIO CASH SALANCE . 
INSURANCS .PHYSICAL O A M A O I INS. CO. ,4)1^^ « 
4>0 
COVERAGE V f RIPIEO 8 Y 
GOOO, 
BOOT 8) PRAM8 • 
INTERIOR Q 
< TIRES • 
MOTOR Q 
PAINT • 
* GLASS • 
COLOR 1 
INSPECTED BY | 
DATE 
AUTOMOBILE INSPECTION REPORT 
PAIR POOR 
D • 
a a 
a a 
a a 
a a 
a a 
l 
i| 
1411 I A A C , ,„ 
• i « i A ^ N(J, , _ » _ 
PURCHASSO PROM . 
COLLATERAL V A L U A T I O N 
RETAIL 
f 
LOAN VALUE 
8 
LOANOECISION Q ^ 
DATE 
f £ * Q NO 
PROPERTY TO BE IMPROVED 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
PURCHASE PRICE 8 
BALANCE OWING 
APPRAISEO VALUE . 
Hl*ft 
Terms _ T«rt T«m 
D . l - P . -
O.N.O.. 
O.l-P.. 
D.N.O.. 
0.1_P._ 
OM.O.. 
Rating. -Alii*-
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DRAPE Rj&J 
cr T R U S T - ^ - ^ ^ ^ DMAPCft. UTAH MOaO 
RiMiniK i^ r>i-> l'rocficxis DATE January 9 . 1979 
PAY TO T H E 
ORDER O F ^ C l a u d i a Brown k Mot iva t ion Auto : _ • _ 
97105 4 
1243 p 
I 
N2 46407 
. _ * U » 5 Q 0 J 1 Q • _ J 
DRA 8 AN*X I # * O CHES 
CASHIER'S CHECK 
««ou6i,o?«« »:i2»*3«»oi0 5«: m^qoa305«# 
_ i . DOLLARS % 
^ - W - . 
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y \ j BOHD MO. ^ 3 3 4 4 1 6 - ^ 
EXHIBIT A 
I O N D OF MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER OR SALESMAN 
:1. .. 
I « • • • • 
f ' • . 
•H •*•• 
*:* 
f%:l 
KNOW AU M£N §Y THESE FtescNTSi Thot we. Bug P*xtx\.JUiUiaifc«ji..Iac* 
Slroot Address 1 . 1 5 0 ^ ^ Ciry 3 A . U . X d * » ...CitoL 
County of . . . . g^ l t L « k * ' ~ —••• Ulo*l» a t Principal, ond - ..... _ 
.>£&CT^N...J?.UWr^ .PAW.. ALTO... CAUJP.OKtJXA 
O Sorofy Company qualified and authorised to do business in mo State ol Utah as Surety, art jointly ond 
severally Hold ond firmly bound to the people s4 the Sloio ol Utah ta indemnify ony ond oil persons, firms 
and corporations lor ony lot* suffered by reason ol violation ol mo conditions hereinafter contained, in the 
ponal sum of TWEMTX..THOUSAMl>r-m^.-r.tr^«. Dollars ( S - 2 0 T 0 0 0 ,00mw*.) lawful monoy ol mo Uniiod 
mo poymont ol which, wall and truly to bo mado, wo bind ourselves, our hoirs, executors, admin-
iMBimrt and assigns, jointly, severally and.firmly by Ihoto eraser**. 
TMC CONOITION Of THIS OillGATlON IS SUCH. That. 
WMftfAS, mo above bounden principal bos appllod for a tkonso 1 
. .. Masar Vohido DftAieUC 
1 of Utah, and mat pursuant la mo application, a tkonso has boon or is about ta bo issued. 
%. 
ri? •*. 
: 'It 
,".-
:
-F:.'-V-:::-iV..' 
•i\*i • & . 
• • ; • * • ! 
' v,'.' 
;\::\ 
VI 
- - ^ V r U . 
• X 
m 
t 
NOW, THUfPOtC. if mo above boundon principal shall obtain sold license 
^ . ___ Motor Vohklo . . ? • * * • £ . 
well and truly obtarvo and comply with all tho roqwiromonts ond provisions of TH€ ACT PtOViOlNG FOt 
THC ttOWATrON ANO CONTIOl OP THC tUSINcSS Of Of AlINO IN MOTOt VEHICLES, as provided by Chaptor 
3, Titte 41, Utah Codo Annotated. I t53, ond indamnify any ond all parsons, firms and corporations for any 
lass strfforod by reason of tho fraud or fraudulent representeJient made or through the violation of ony of 
tho provision* of said Motor Vehicle Sutinett Act and shall poy all judgments and casts adjudged against said 
principal an account of fraud or fraudulent representations and far any violation or violations of said law 
during tho time of sold license and all lawful renewals ihereof, then tho above obligation shall bo null and 
void, otherwise ta remain in full farce and effect. 
The Surety herein rise rv si tho right ta withdrew* at tuch surety except as ta ony liability already in* 
• currod or accrued hereunder and may do so upon the giving of written nonet of such withdrawal to the 
principal and ta the meter Vehicle Business Administrator* provided, however, that no withdrawal shall bo 
effective for any purpose until sixty days shall hove' e loosed from ond after the receipt of such notice by the 
said administrator, and further .provided that no withdrawal shall in anywise effect tho liability of said 
surety arising out of fraud or fraudulent lopiosontotlons or for ony violation or violations of said low by 
tho principal hereunder prior ta the expiration of such period of sixty days, regardless of whether or not the 
loss suffered has boon reduced to judgment oefore the loose of sixty days. 
this. -lots .„_.**•» 
• . * 1 ^ ' - i >....wi 
t-: ATTBT 
•Y — 
njSLjtiltA 
lot la fort 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
I 
r f c ; ^ ~ ? n ^ 
I kManJL. lA . foa 
i y (Signed) oWton Howard 
-in-roct 
L. tfydla&d, Aoi l sUnt Sacrttary 
• / . . . - „ * - . 
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^ INDIV IDUAL A C K N O W L E D G M E N T OF P R I N C I P A L 
STATE Of UTAH j 
(• » COUNTY Of ' 
0 * ,n,» d«y ©* — W before mo personally como 
to mo known 
and known to mo to bo tho person, and dotcribod in, and who executed tho foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to mo that ho executed tho same. 
(SCAD 
Notary Public 
Commission Expires 
PARTNERSHIP Oft FIRM ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
STATE Of UTAH 
COCNTY Of ;.....' 
£ " 'hi* day of
 MMM.MMMM.M..M.M. 19 ........ before mo personally appeared 
and known to mo to bo one of tho firm of 
described in ond who executed tho tamo a t and for tho act and deed of said firm. 
(UAL) 
Notary Public 
Commission Expires ...T..1T.-T„r„, 
CORPORATE A C K N O W L E D G M E N T O F PRINCIPAL 
STATE Of UTAH 
COUNTY Of 
On tho . . . / . . L t l . . . . day of UJUJL£ ....... in mo year JJlY./t before me pmt-
tonally came „ _ ~ „ to mo known, who, being by mo 
duiy sworn, did depose ond say, That ho resides in that ho is 
of tho ......................... tho corporation 
» described in and which executed tho above instrument; that ho knew tho tool of said corporation; thai tho seal 
affixed to said Instrument was such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of tho Board of Directors 
of said corporation, and that ho signed his name thereto by like order. 
(SEAl) 
Commission Expires . Notary Public 
CORPORATE A C K N O W L E D G M E N T O F PRINCIPAL 
(To bo sxocutod by .rorpiroaao wsmasjt • 
STATE Of UTAH
 n ) 
ts 
COUNTY Of&t^./g^f&f 
On tho ...&....L day of J^&£i^l....._^ ... , in tho year /?.£.£ before me par* 
tonally appeared .... ^ . . . ^ Z < ^ ? . ! < 5 T . ^ ^ . . ^ . . . . . ^ . . . . . ^ tomt known, who, being by mo 
duly tworo, did depose ond toy» That he resides in . i H J 5 . . ^ . . . ^ T . . . . ^ * . Z ^ ^ . ^ . .. that he is 
the ./&*£££&*£i. of tho &£6.&£rj>:.JJ^ the corporation 
which executed the above inttrument and which is described therein; that he signed the above mentioned 
instrument on behalf of said corporation; that ho was authorized to do to by Article .../.. of tho Articles 
of Incorporation of the said corporation, and by order of the Board of Directors of said corporation, and that 
his signature as it thus appears in tho above instrument is binding upon tho corporation. 
(MAU
 ^ /*-,ey, t^A^&VGu*^ 
Expires „<£:£..L^.u£.Z.Z.Z~. ' Notary Public Commission 
AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION | " " £ L ^ Z Z . Z l f 
STATTOf a U F O R M I A - ; l-feS^-HoJrJr.JPIS5O.HU | 
!
 M . 1 V ^ M ^ W COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | 
COUNTY OF » « * - 5 H « L [ i ^&s »,cr^.r?..i??..'iJ!!L.i 
l4*.J&flULeUKL ... being first duiy sworn, on oath 
deposes and toyt that he it fhe^SS. ia t .^ .^r .SeCWtary
 0f M j j company, and that he it duiy authorized 
to execute and deliver the foregoing obligations; that said company it authorized to execute the same ond 
hat complied in ail respects with tho Laws of Utah in reference to becoming sole surely upon bonds, under-
takings ond obligations. y c '/Z-> // / ? ( / 
Subscribed,and sworn to befocea„ nn f ^2^L^../J^3^<^ 
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